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REGULATORY MODELS FOR SPORTS 
WAGERING: THE DEBATE BETWEEN STATE 
VS. FEDERAL OVERSIGHT1 
Keith C. Miller and Anthony N. Cabot2 
INTRODUCTION 
The “legalization” of sports betting in the United States is only a beginning 
point for sports betting being available outside Nevada. The federal and state 
governments should address several issues regarding the structure and methods 
of regulating the activity. Thinking that the many key questions relating to a 
sports betting regime will answer themselves is unrealistic. Choices should be 
made on issues that are likely to be contentious. Chief among these matters is 
determining whether the locus of regulation should be in the federal 
government, left with the states, or involve both. Beyond that, important details 
relating to contest integrity, promoting competition and innovation, and 
spurring fan engagement will need to be considered carefully. 
Like most forms of gaming regulation, the regulatory model(s) that 
emerge(s) will likely be a product of political compromise. The models we set 
out here are not meant to be an exhaustive list of possibilities. They do, 
however, offer a template for considering the objectives regulators and 
policymakers should keep in mind in establishing a regulatory system. Any 
regulatory system should seek to achieve the values and goals that are 
identified by policymakers as important. The more self-conscious policymakers 
are in identifying these values, the better the regulatory system is likely to be. 
Before discussing the models, two foundational issues will supply 
necessary context. The first is a description of the historical relationship 
between the federal and the state governments as it relates to the regulation of 
gambling. Regulatory models that deviate from this association may create 
problems of implementation as the federal-state relationship is restructured. 
The second is an explanation of the factors that will be the basis for 
                                                          
1 This article is derived from an upcoming chapter of SPORTS WAGERING IN 
AMERICA: POLICY, ECONOMICS & REGULATION, by Anthony N. Cabot & Keith C. 
Miller (forthcoming Spring 2018 by UNLV Gaming Press). 
2 Anthony N. Cabot is a Distinguished Fellow at the UNLV Boyd School of Law. 
Keith C. Miller is the Ellis and Nelle Levitt Distinguished Professor of Law at 
Drake University. 
MILLER_CABOT ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2018  9:52 AM 
154  UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:153 
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the potential models of 
regulation. 
I.    HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
GOVERNMENTS 
Before the passage of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(“PASPA”),3 federal policy towards gambling was relatively simple. Rather 
than preempting state laws, federal gambling laws were to aid states in 
enforcing their laws that prohibit gambling. There are several examples. 
In adopting the Federal Wire Act,4 Congress in 1961 made clear its respect 
for the rights of individual states to regulate gambling within their borders.5 
The Travel Act,6 the Wagering Paraphernalia Act,7 and the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act8 are laws enacted during the 1960s and 1970s that also illustrated 
the supplementary role of federal gambling laws. Congress passed these laws in 
response to the proliferation of illegal multistate gambling operations 
conducted by organized crime.9 The federal government intervened because 
states could not adequately investigate and prosecute criminal organizations 
that operated in multiple states. The creation of separate federal offenses based 
on a predicate state law violation gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation the 
authority to investigate and the Department of Justice the ability to prosecute 
national crime organizations. 
These considerations also have application to the regulation of sports 
betting. Once again, a lack of resources or jurisdictional authority limits the 
ability of state governments to regulate interstate or foreign businesses. Federal 
intervention is necessary to achieve goals that are beyond the jurisdictional 
reach of the states. In the context of sports wagering, these goals include: (a) 
international criminal cooperation for the exchange of intelligence and 
information related to the investigation and prosecution of manipulation of 
sports results at national and international levels; (b) establishing common 
standards for extraterritorial jurisdiction and international extradition; (c) 
agreeing to collect, preserve and share evidence (including electronic data) with 
                                                          
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 1804 (2012). 
5 See United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276, 277 (N.D. W. Va 1962) (“The 
purpose of the [Wire Act] is succinctly stated in Report No. 588 of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee of the 87th Congress, on July 24, 1961, as ‘* * * to assist the 
several States in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling and to aid in 
the suppression of organized gambling activities by restricting the use of wire 
communication facilities.’”). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 1952. 
7 Id. § 1953. 
8 Id. § 1955. 
9 See United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970); see also United 
States v. Aquino, 336 F. Supp. 737, 739 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
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foreign governments relating to competition manipulation; and (d) agreeing to 
require licensed sports books to provide betting data to national and 
international data bases to detect criminal behavior. 
Since the passage of the Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”), however, 
federal intervention into gambling regulation has become more prevalent. With 
this law, first passed in 1978,10 Congress exercised control over the economics 
of the sport of horseracing. The law requires that race books share a portion of 
each wager with the race tracks and the horse owners on whose racing events 
the race books were accepting wagers.11 The legislative history of the law 
indicates that Congress saw this revenue sharing as promoting the stability of 
horseracing and off-track betting in the United States.12 As a practical matter, 
the off-track race books have to negotiate a contract with the track to conduct 
wagering on the track’s races.13 Because both parties need the other to 
maximize profits they have relatively equal bargaining power. The Act also 
seeks to assure that horsemen receive fair shares of interstate wagers by 
including their consent as a “condition precedent” to the agreements.14 
Congress’ intervention in horseracing may have relevance to sports 
wagering. PASPA prevented states from determining their policy towards 
gambling on sporting events involving humans, as the IHA did with sporting 
events involving horses. If in a system of widespread regulated sports betting, 
sports books had to pay to the leagues a portion of every bet, the IHA would be 
a valuable precedent. 
                                                          
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3007 (2012). 
11 To this end, the original version of the Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”) 
prescribed rules for “interstate off-track wager[ing],” which Congress defined as a 
“legal wager placed or accepted in one State with respect to the outcome of a 
horserace taking place in another State.” Id. § 3002(3). 
12 Congress envisioned an interstate pari-mutuel scheme to ensure that states would 
“cooperate with one another in the acceptance of legal interstate wagering.” See id. 
§ 3001(3). 
13 The IHA governs the relationship between the OTB operators, licensed internet 
and interactive television horse race betting services, the tracks, the horse owners 
and trainers, and the state racing commissions. All other aspects of horseracing, 
such as licensing and policing, are left to the discretion of the various state racing 
or gaming commissions. Before an OTB operator can accept an interstate off-track 
wager, “consent” must be obtained from three parties: (1) the track; (2) the racing 
commission in the state where the track is located; and, (3) the racing commission 
in the state where the OTB operator is located. The use of the word “consent” 
should not mask the true intent of the Act, however. Consent comes with a price, 
either in the form of an agreement to provide wire information or a simulcast, or to 
conduct pari-mutuel wagering. 
14 The IHA has met its original objective of assuring that the tracks receive a fair 
share of interstate wagers on races conducted at its track. The respective rights of 
the OTB operator and the track are well defined under the IHA. This usually 
includes provisions for the merging of pari-mutuel pools and the receipt by the 
OTB operator of the race simulcast and instantaneous transmission of all tote (i.e., 
wagering) and other track information. See 15 U.S.C. § 3004(a)(1). 
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PASPA and the IHA are consistent in one other important aspect.15 Neither 
act attempts to create a federal regulatory scheme over the gambling activity 
itself. In the case of PASPA, the intention was to create a national prohibition 
against state-authorized sports wagering. With the IHA, the intention was to 
assure that the race books compensated the parties that created the event upon 
which race books offered wagering. While the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in the case brought by New Jersey challenging the constitutionality of 
PASPA may put to rest that federal effort to determine state policies toward 
sports betting, Congress may seek other ways to intrude on these state 
prerogatives. 
The federal government has historically played no role in the discharge of 
the traditional regulatory functions of licensing, enforcement, and audit. It has, 
however, asserted regulatory authority over some aspects of casino operations, 
the most prominent being anti-money laundering laws.16 For example, casinos 
                                                          
15 What is striking about the PASPA and IHA is that while both laws address 
sporting events with highly skilled athletes, their treatment of the activities is quite 
different. In the case of horseracing, Congress shows no concern for the impact of 
wagering on the integrity of the sport. Instead, Congress’ concern is to assure that 
the various stakeholders in the sport are fairly compensated when persons accept 
wagers on their events. No proof exists that horseracing is any more tainted with 
scandal than other sports. The only difference is that the powerful horseracing 
industry wants wagering on their sport and the powerful professional sports leagues 
want a ban on sports wagering that does not involve horses. 
16 Money laundering is the process by which criminals transform the money that 
they receive from criminal activities into funds that appear to have been generated 
by lawful means and cannot be traced by law enforcement to their illicit sources. 
“Money laundering involves three steps. The first is placement, which involves 
changing the form of the funds into a less suspicious, more easily manipulated 
form. Placement is the most well-known phase of money laundering. Criminals, 
particularly drug dealers, tend to accumulate their money from the sale of drugs to 
customers in smaller denominations. . .[t]hese funds tend to be bulky and difficult 
to transport. Therefore, methods need to be devised to convert the smaller bills into 
larger bills, bank checks, money orders, traveler’s checks, or some other form of 
cash equivalent.” 
ANTHONY N. CABOT & KEITH C. MILLER, THE LAW OF GAMBLING AND 
REGULATED GAMING 58–59 (2d ed. 2016). 
“The next step is to layer the funds. Layering is the method by which criminals 
distance themselves from the converted funds. The idea is to provide a series of 
financial transactions that inhibit the ability of law enforcement to track the money 
back to their owner of source. This frequently involves wire transfers between bank 
accounts, often in foreign countries.” 
Id. at 59. 
“The final step is integration, which involves transferring the layered funds from 
the foreign country into a mainstream financial world in the US through a 
transaction that has legitimate commercial purpose.” Id. Using wagering operations 
for “placement” is different for land-based and internet operators. The latter 
generally are not set up to accept cash. Instead, they typically use a third-party 
intermediary to obtain money from the customer. In some cases, however, illegal 
internet operators have used runners to accept large cash deposits from patrons in 
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and sportsbooks must report certain currency payments and suspicious activity 
to comply with Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) regulations promulgated by the 
federal agency called the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”).17 Sports books must file Currency Transaction Reports (“CTR”) 
for all cash transactions over $10,000, either individually or in the aggregate, in 
one gaming day.18 While all suspicious activity may not warrant a CTR 
because of the currency transaction value,19 the sports book must file a 
                                                          
person and establish on-line account wagering. The patrons will simply wager 
against the moneys held on account and at his request have amounts debited from 
the account and returned in cash to the patron in person. Wagering operations can 
assist in in the layering process of laundering money. A value of involving 
wagering operations is that the funds can be disguised as winnings when, in fact, no 
“gambling” transaction has ever taken place. Take, for example, an unscrupulous 
operator in an unregulated environment. A drug dealer could set up multiple 
accounts with the operator. Some accounts result in the drug dealer “losing” all the 
deposited funds, while other accounts result in the drug dealer “winning.” The 
funds from the winning accounts are then transferred to an internet bank in the 
“layering” process. To anyone investigating the trail, the funds appear to be 
legitimate internet casino winnings. For example, if a patron bets $100,000 on one 
side of a football game in one account and $100,000 on the other side in a different 
account, then one account will show a large gain and the patron is only out the 
vigorish. In both scenarios, the account with the large gain will look like a 
legitimate gambling win. More pertinent to sports integrity, however, is when the 
criminals rather than simply using the wagering operations to launder money at the 
standard vigorish, attempt to use the markets to both launder money and make a 
profit by fixing the games on which they place wagers. 
SportAccord estimates that sports betting could now be used to launder more than 
€11,000m worldwide and that the winnings of fixed matches could represent up to 
€6.8bn. Christian Kalb, Integrity in Sport, SPORTACCORD 1, 34 (Nov. 2011), 
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/11687088/integrity-in-sport-
understanding-and-sportaccord/35. Criminals, however, make money laundering 
through wagering operations profitable by corrupting the games on which they bet. 
See Emine Bozkurt (Member of the Special Committee on Organized Crime, 
Corruption and Money Laundering), Match Fixing and Fraud in Sport: Putting the 
Pieces Together, at 2 (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/ 
activities/cont/201209/20120925ATT52303/20120925ATT52303EN.pdf. 
The wagering industry is particularly suspect to layering because: high liquidity; is 
a cash business and has fluid cash flow; has easily accessible global markets; has 
significant unregulated markets; has a lack of harmony in regulations and a lack of 
cooperation between regulated markets; winnings are tax free in some jurisdictions 
and/or winnings can be easily transferred to other jurisdictions. 
17 The forms used to report such activities are FinCEN Form 112: Currency 
Transaction Reports (CTR) and FinCEN Form 111: Suspicious Activity Report 
(SAR). 
18 Besides the standard CTRs filed for a single currency transaction, casinos must 
file CTRs for reportable multiple transactions identified through the aggregation of 
daily records. As such, the sports book will periodically update records used to 
assist with customer verification to ensure their accuracy. 
19 A sports book must have internal controls to detect suspicious activity, using a 
risk-based approach to the areas of products and services, customers, geographic 
areas, and transaction types. 
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Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) if it observes a suspicious activity whether 
attempted or completed and involving $5,000 or more in funds or other assets.20 
II.    FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
This section sets out seven primary factors that policymakers can consider 
in evaluating different models that assign control over the regulation of sports 
wagering to the federal government, the states, or a combination of both. Then, 
the relevant factors will be used to examine the advantages and disadvantages 
of each model and, in some cases, the political dynamics of gaming regulation 
that may favor or disfavor a model. 
Regulation can promote inefficiencies in a market in several ways: by 
setting prices above competitive rates, restricting information that consumers 
use to price shop, and by creating “barriers to entry.” Governments, the public, 
and the casino industry should understand the consequences of regulation and 
the factors that produce those consequences. An awareness of the costs of 
regulation on price and innovation can help to make regulation more efficient 
and the price of the gaming product lower. 
A. Barriers to Entry / Pricing 
Most common among the indirect economic consequences of regulation is 
the creation of barriers to entry. The absence of barriers to entry helps to 
promote competitive market models. Markets are fluid; demand can rise and 
                                                          
20 See Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Final Rule 
Amending Casino Currency Reporting Requirements Announced (June 21, 2007), 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20070621b.pdf. The FinCEN casino-
specific website also provides the casino industry with BSA compliance. See 
Important Information for Casinos, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https:// 
www.fincen.gov/resources/financial-institutions/casinos (last visited Mar. 10, 
2018); see also Filing Information, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https:// 
www.fincen.gov/resources/filing-information (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) 
(providing BSA forms and filing requirements). FinCEN expects the following 
types of information in SARs: 
• Complete customer information, such as name, permanent address, government-
issued identification number, date of birth and patron account number 
• A narrative that describes the suspicious activity including: 
describing the suspicious activity in a complete and chronological way; 
identifying “who,” “what,” “when,” “why,” “where,” and “how”; 
identifying whether the transaction was attempted or completed; 
noting any actions (taken or planned) by the sports book, including any internal 
investigative measures to maintain records of the suspicious activity; and 
including contact information for persons at the sports book with additional 
information about the suspicious activity. 
See FinCEN Form 111: Suspicious Activity Report, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/ fin102_sar-c.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2018). 
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fall. If demand increases and prices do not change, excess demand would 
occur, and prices would inevitably rise. With higher prices, firms supply more, 
and prices may rise until supply increases. A common means of increasing 
supply is when new participants enter the market because they are attracted by 
the potential return on investment. If barriers to entry inhibit potential entrants, 
existing market participants can enjoy the benefits of higher prices and, most 
likely, positive economic profits. 
The costs and burdens of regulatory compliance on the sportsbooks can 
create barriers to entry that have a significant impact on pricing and 
competition. An unintended economic consequence of gaming regulation is 
higher prices for gaming products. Regulatory compliance costs include the 
direct costs of government regulation, as well as the indirect costs that come 
from any economic inefficiencies created by regulation. In contrast, illegal 
sportsbooks have minimal regulatory costs, low or no taxes, and high liquidity. 
This permits them to offer lower “pricing” in the form of better odds than the 
regulated sportsbooks. 
That regulation has an economic impact by restricting entry does not mean 
the regulation is necessarily good or bad. Achieving policy goals may be worth 
the costs of regulation. For example, the legal requirement for medical doctors 
to obtain a license to practice is intended to protect the public from possible 
harm to their health. The consequences that unqualified persons may poorly 
administer medical treatment may justify limiting the number of medical 
providers. It will, however, raise the costs of medical services. 
Gaming licensing is supposed to create a barrier to entry. Few would 
dispute that keeping persons who are likely to cheat customers or who are 
members of organized crime from entering the industry is a desirable goal. The 
imposition of reasonable costs is necessary to achieve such goals. If a 
jurisdiction’s licensing system were perfect, only those who fit the 
government’s standards would obtain a license. Licensing, however, cannot be 
done with total efficiency because the process erects barriers relating to costs, 
risks, delays, or potential adverse publicity that may keep out suitable potential 
entrants. 
State licensing requirements also can create absolute barriers to entry. If 
sportsbooks could only operate in casinos or racetracks, that prevents other 
qualified companies from providing services in that state. This restricts a 
bettor’s choice of potential sportsbooks and will almost certainly produce 
higher prices to the detriment of the bettors and the advantage of the illegal 
offshore bookmakers. 
Moreover, a lack of regulatory uniformity between governmental entities 
also raises costs and barriers to entry. For example, if states individually 
regulate sports wagering and each requires a separate license, the costs of 
getting licensed in each state favors companies with large capital resources and 
creates a significant barrier to entry for other companies. The same is true when 
sportsbooks must operate within numerous regulatory systems having 
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dissimilar regulations, standards, processes, and enforcement. Uniformity in 
regulation, on the other hand, lowers entry barriers for new companies and 
reduces costs. 
B. Liquidity 
Liquidity in this context refers to the amount of money wagered (handle), 
which is functionally related to the amount of money that players can wager 
and win. Greater liquidity lowers pricing because fixed costs are spread over a 
larger base. It also increases the choice of wagers because sportsbooks can offer 
less popular wagers if a sufficient market exists to justify the cost of 
implementation. Lower liquidity on the other hand may result in the sports 
books setting lower bet limits to manage risk better.21 
High liquidity in illegal markets makes competition manipulation more 
difficult to detect. This is because the amounts wagered from corrupt sources 
may still not be enough to trigger concerns of unusual activity. On the other 
hand, high liquidity is good for regulated markets because the more data that is 
subject to analysis and early warning systems, the more likely that corruptors 
will be deterred or discovered. As one commentator noted: 
Attempts to reduce liquidity by imposing restrictions in 
domestic betting markets may, if anything, prove 
counter-productive. For example, if certain bet types are 
prohibited, or if domestic operators are constrained to 
offer ‘unattractive’ odds, serious bettors, who are 
responsible for a disproportionate share of volume, may 
shift their activities to the international market, further 
enhancing liquidity in the part of the market where 
regulatory supervision is weak or non-existent. This 
appears to be the opposite of what is needed. There is a 
prima facie argument for improving choice and value for 
bettors willing to trade in a supervised environment 
because, where they do so, this will reduce liquidity in 
the unsupervised sector.22 
C. Revenue Potential 
This factor looks at which model is most likely to result in the highest 
generation of gross revenue, which, after expenses, leads to net income and 
taxable revenue. Revenue potential is important because it impacts the number 
of potential competitors and their willingness to commit capital. It also affects 
                                                          
21 See discussion infra Part III. 
22 David Forrest, Match Fixing: An Economics Perspective, in MATCH-FIXING IN 
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS: EXISTING PROCESSES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND 
PREVENTION STRATEGIES, 177, 196 (M.R. Haberfield & D. Sheehan eds., 2013). 
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the ability of the government to maximize tax revenues based on the net 
income of sportsbooks. 
D. Fan Engagement 
Fan engagement is a phrase used to describe the behaviors that followers of 
a sport, team, or athlete engage in. This includes such things as watching games 
in person, on mobile devices or television, buying team or athlete-related 
products, reading sports print or digital media, and communicating with others 
regarding their interests or experiences.23 Sports leagues have a keen interest in 
sports wagering as a method to increase fan engagement.24 Television ratings 
for most sports have declined,25 for reasons that are not clear. One possibility is 
the “cord-cutting” that has been a result of the growth of mobile technology 
and viewing options for viewers.26 In any event, one of the reasons the leagues 
have been supporters of fantasy sports, and more recently, daily fantasy sports, 
is a belief that having a financial stake in a sporting contest promotes “fan 
engagement.”27 This may be another way of saying that people may watch a 
                                                          
23 See Masayuki Yoshida, Brian Gordon, Makoto Nakazawa, & Rui Biscaia, 
Conceptualization and Measurement of Fan Engagement: Empirical Evidence 
From a Professional Sport Context, 28 J. OF SPORT MGMT. 399, 399 (2014). 
24 See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
25 The ratings decline for the NFL has been a well-documented trend over the past 
several years and has continued into the first half of the 2017 season. Through the 
first six weeks of the 2017 NFL season, networks have witnessed a decline of 7.5 
percent compared to the same time period in 2016. Compounded with the eight 
percent decline in rating in 2016 compared with 2015, the National Football 
League has lost a substantial amount of television viewers over the last couple 
years. See Scooby Axson, NFL TV Ratings Down 7.5 Percent, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/10/18/nfl-television-
ratings-decline. Ratings decline has not been limited solely to professional football, 
as the NBA has experienced a decline in viewership on their regional sports 
networks. See John Ourand & John Lombardo, NBA’s RSN Ratings Down 15 
Percent This Season, SPORTSBUS. DAILY (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.sports 
businessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2017/02/20/Media/NBA-RSNs.aspx. 
26 Cord cutting has accelerated in recent years with “cord cutters” in 2017 far 
outpacing previous projections. It is estimated that by 2021, there will be a ten 
percent decline in cable subscriptions from 2016 numbers. See Todd Spangler, 
Cord-Cutting Explodes: 22 Million U.S. Adults Will Have Canceled Cable, Satellite 
TV by End of 2017, VARIETY (Sept. 13, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://variety.com/ 
2017/biz/news/cord-cutting-2017-estimates-cancel-cable-satellite-tv-1202556594/ 
(noting that cord cutters have increased thirty-three percent from 2016, up to over 
22 million former cable and satellite TV subscribers). 
27 In recent years, several of the leagues and player associations have engaged with 
some form of relationship with the two major players in the industry, DraftKings 
and FanDuel. See Kristi Dosh, NFL Players Association Inks Licensing Deal with 
DraftKings, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2015, 9:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kristidosh/2015/09/29/nfl-players-association-inks-licensing-deal-with-draftkings/ 
#7d70e3af374c; Darren Heitner, DraftKings and Major League Baseball Extend 
Exclusive Partnership, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
MILLER_CABOT ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2018  9:52 AM 
162  UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:153 
game they are not otherwise interested in, or that they may continue to watch a 
game after the overall result is clear, when they stand to win or lose money on 
the contest. 
Until recently, the leagues have substantially opposed fan engagement 
produced by single-game wagering. While this view is evolving, single-game 
betting is not the only way to promote engagement, as fantasy sports has 
illustrated. The leagues are seeking new and innovative ways for fans to 
interact with the games, and the athletes, to promote increased viewership and 
interest in the sports. States might be incentivized to develop novel forms of 
wagering that will promote liquidity for the sports betting markets and perhaps 
boost viewership. This will inure to the benefit of the sports leagues as well as 
those involved in operating these new sports betting products. While mere 
single game wagering alone is a vehicle for increased fan engagement, other 
wagering products designed to be more interactive with the player might also 
have appeal. These wagering products would serve the same function as fantasy 
sports did for skill-based contests. 
Fantasy sports was a disruptive product that changed the way that sports 
leagues and media outlets delivered sports to the consumer. For example, the 
“RedZone” is a television channel that switches from stadium to stadium to 
capture highlights of significant plays in the games, and offers live coverage 
when one team is threatening to score based on its field position. The NFL and 
media partners designed this channel for the fantasy player.28 Other innovative 
sports betting products will be an essential part of enhancing fan engagement 
by embracing the way fans consume sports. It is likely that these products will 
surpass traditional sports wagering in encouraging engagement. 
E. Speed to market 
Speed to market has two aspects. The first is how quickly operators can 
offer a sports wagering product to the public in places where legal. The second 
is how quickly individual competitors can bring new products or product 
innovations to market considering regulatory hurdles such as product 
approvals. 
                                                          
sites/darrenheitner/2015/04/02/draftkings-and-major-league-baseball-extend-
exclusive-partnership/#3eeefa006ba7; Darren Heitner, NHL Does Multi-Year 
Exclusive Deal With DraftKings, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2014, 7:55 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2014/11/10/nhl-does-multi-year-
exclusive-deal-with-draftkings/#26a1e99f7a34; see also Dustin Gouker, DFS 
Partnership / Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, https://www.legal 
sportsreport.com/dfs-sponsorship-tracker/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (providing a 
comprehensive tracker of the partnerships between sports leagues and franchises 
and DraftKings and FanDuel). 
28 Nick Greene, RedZone is the Cause of and Solution to All of the NFL’s 
Problems, SLATE (Sept. 17, 2017, 8:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_ 
slatest/2017/09/17/redzone_is_the_cause_of_and_solution_to_all_of_the_nfl_s_pro
blems.html. 
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F. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness looks at whether the regulatory processes accomplish the 
public policy goals. Four common ways that regulatory processes fail to meet 
their goals are knowledge failure, instrument failure, implementation failure, 
and motivation failure.29 Knowledge failure occurs where the government has 
insufficient knowledge: (a) to identify what the regulation is attempting to 
accomplish, and (b) to design appropriate laws or regulations or identify non-
compliance.30 Instrument failure is where the laws or regulations (the 
instruments) are inappropriate or unsophisticated.31 Implementation failure 
occurs when enforcement mechanisms fail to accomplish policy goals.32 This 
can occur because the government does not have the knowledge, competence, 
resources, or money to regulate effectively. Motivation failure takes place when 
those regulating are insufficiently motivated to enforce the law because of 
inaction or corruption.33 
G. Political Viability 
States are hesitant to give up control over gambling to the federal 
government. Part of this is a fundamental states’ rights argument. Another 
factor, however, may be to protect their home state industries. For example, 
exclusive licenses to conduct sports wagering are likely to go to the state lottery 
in a state with a dominant state lottery and a weak or non-existent casino 
industry. Similarly, in states with a politically powerful casino (or horseracing) 
industry, licenses may be issued only to those companies that already have 
licenses. The political strength of casinos, horse race interests, and lotteries 
within a state can complicate a uniform federal approach to regulation. 
III.    CATEGORY ONE — STATE REGULATORY APPROACHES 
Within a framework of state-by-state regulation, there are several 
possibilities. Each would draw from models of regulation for other forms of 
gambling. 
A. State Model #1: The Status Quo 
A basic state regulatory approach would be a purely intrastate system 
where an operator would need to have a physical presence and obtain a gaming 
license in the specific state to offer sports wagering there. The federal 
                                                          




32 See id. 
33 See id. 
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government’s role would be limited to providing enforcement for interstate or 
foreign crimes, which does not extend to regulation. As noted earlier, for the 
most part, this is the existing approach that is used for casino wagering.34 The 
trade association for the casino industry contends that maintaining the current 
division of responsibilities between the state and federal governments is the 
best structure.35 This model preserves both the status quo and where applicable, 
the exclusivity of the casinos’ existing licenses. 
Benefits might include: 
•  Speed to Market. States already have regulatory apparatuses in place 
that could create the foundation for sports regulation. For example, New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that if New Jersey won the Supreme 
Court case its casinos and racetracks could begin offering sports wagering 
within two weeks because the state had prepared for the contingency.36 
Other states could quickly emulate Nevada or New Jersey by piggybacking 
off their existing regulatory processes. Nevada uses the same licensing, 
accounting, audit, and enforcement agents to regulate both the casinos and 
sports books. Due in large part to the limitations set by PASPA, Nevada 
has enjoyed a substantial head start over other states and has a well-
developed sports wagering system.37 Consequently, states may initially 
look to Nevada for how a model of the regulation of sports wagering 
should operate within existing regulatory structures. But this would likely 
evolve as states began to improve on and adapt the Nevada model. 
Moreover, states could develop their regulatory structures as “laboratories” 
for other states to learn from. This process of learning from the examples 
of other states is one of the most widely-valued characteristics of our 
                                                          
34 Nevada would be an obvious example of the intrastate regulatory approach. See 
New Applicant Pre-Opening Checklist Group I Nonrestricted Licensee, NEV. 
GAMING CONTROL BD., http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx? 
documentid=2214 (last updated May 15, 2009) (providing the Nevada Gaming 
Control Board’s New Applicant Pre-Opening Checklist for a Nonrestricted 
Licensee). 
35 The American Gaming Association, which is the lobbying arm of the casino 
industry, supports a new organization called the American Sports Betting Coalition. 
The official position on how the government should regulate sports wagering is on 
its website. See Embracing America’s Passion Through Effective Regulation, AM. 
SPORTS BETTING COAL., http://www.sportsbettinginamerica.com/industry-
positioning/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2018). In short, it provides a key goal is to 
“ensure the integrity of sports betting and sports themselves through 
appropriate licensing and regulation by state and tribal gaming 
commissions.” 
36 See Associated Press, Christie: NJ Sports Betting Could Begin Quickly, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/videos/news/nation/2017/12/04/ 
christie-nj-sports-betting-could-begin-quickly/108305738/. 
37 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 
4227 (1992). 
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federal structure.38 
•  Effectiveness of Wagering Integrity. States would have autonomy to 
tailor a sports wagering system that fit their own peculiar set of values and 
regulatory goals; the tradition of local control of gambling would be 
promoted. Finally, states might be more responsive to technological change 
and would be able to adapt more quickly to proposals for innovation. 
•  Political Viability. A state model may be the only viable option given 
the difficulties of enacting legislation in an intensely partisan Congress. 
Drawbacks might include: 
•  Potentially High Barriers to Entry Due to High Compliance Costs. 
Companies with a presence in multiple states have extremely high 
compliance costs. For example, if states did not limit sports book licenses 
to their existing casinos, racetracks, or tribal gaming operations, a company 
wanting to obtain licenses nationwide would be in the same position as 
manufacturers of gaming equipment. A licensed manufacturer of slot 
machines may need over 100 gaming licenses between state and tribal 
governments to sell their wares in the United States. Moreover, the 
technical standards for sports book systems and methods for 
communicating remotely with bettors may differ among jurisdictions. If, 
for example, states required functionality such as computer servers and key 
personnel to be physically located in the state, massive inefficiencies that 
raise costs and create significant barriers to entry would exist. These costs 
increase prices to the betting public and affect the legal industry’s ability to 
compete against illegal off-shore sportsbooks which can offer better odds 
because they have lower costs. 
•  Absolute Barriers to Entry Based on Licensing Criteria. Politics can 
play a significant role in shaping a state’s regulatory policy. Those 
influencing policy may promote a protectionist (“ring fence”) approach 
where states have the incentive to implement laws that would benefit 
existing operators. An existing system can serve as an anticompetitive tool 
that allows existing casinos, racetracks, and tribes to maintain their 
exclusive licenses to the determent of other competitors that may be better 
financed, have superior technology and experience, and have more 
innovative products. For example, New Jersey’s sportsbook law limits the 
granting of licenses to existing casinos and racetracks, neither of which 
have experience in sports betting. This absolute barrier to entry may stifle 
innovation and create uncompetitive odds that could disadvantage the 
sports betting public.39 
                                                          
38 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J., 
dissenting) (“[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try. . .experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
39 Protectionism’s harm on consumers has long been identified and analyzed by 
economists. See Robert Z. Lawrence & Robert E. Litan, Why Protectionism 
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•  Placing Small States at a Disadvantage. A small state would have the 
same fixed costs as larger states in establishing the regulatory infrastructure 
that is essential to the proper regulation of sports wagering. These costs 
include adequately trained personnel such as licensing agents, audit and 
accounting staff, and enforcement agents, as well as equipment. Small 
states would face liquidity problems as small betting pools produced low 
revenues, fewer bet options, and higher pricing. All this would damage the 
ability of a small population state to offer a competitive range of sports 
wagering products 
•  Difficulties of Ensuring Sports Integrity. A state-centric approach may 
complicate if not frustrate the pursuit of sports integrity. Regulatory 
structures in place to protect the integrity of casino gambling have limited 
application to sports wagering. States and tribes have vast experience in 
regulating land-based gaming including casinos and gaming devices 
outside of casinos. The regulation of wagering integrity and sports 
integrity, however, is very different. Regardless of whether the government 
is regulating casinos to protect the bettor, maximize taxes, or create jobs, a 
standard policy goal of every regulatory system is to assure the honesty of 
the games offered to the public. Casino patrons are susceptible to fraud if 
an unscrupulous casino operator uses cheating methods to assure that a 
random event does not determine the gambling contracts. A dishonest 
casino can cheat the players by predetermining or influencing the result to 
its advantage. Gamblers who are cheated are unlikely to play at the 
casinos; this impacts taxes, jobs, and the general economy of the 
jurisdiction. A casino operator is honest if it offers games whose 
determinative outcomes are random. Given the importance of honesty to 
the gaming industry, governments that regulate casino gaming implement 
multi-faceted regulatory schemes such as licensing, technical standards, 
extensive testing, field observation and review, periodic audit and internal 
control requirements. 
 Sports and casino wagering share similar aspects. Legally, all wagers 
are contracts; the price (amount won or lost) is honored according to the 
terms of the contract when the bettor and a bookmaker enter it. The 
distinctive part of a wagering contract is that promise of performance is 
based on a future contingent event (the outcome of the casino game or the 
sports competition) not under the control of the casino or sports book, on 
the one hand, or the bettor, on the other. After that, whether the sports book 
or the casino must fulfill its promise to pay the bettor is dependent on the 
terms of the bet and the outcome of the future contingent event, either the 
casino game or sporting event. The difference between casino wagering 
contracts and sports wagering contracts is that state regulators tightly 
                                                          
Doesn’t Pay, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 1987), https://hbr.org/1987/05/why-
protectionism-doesnt-pay. 
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control the regulation of the future contingent event in casino contracts. 
Assuring the honesty of the underlying event that determines the outcome 
of a sports wager, in contrast, is much different. These uncertain contingent 
events do not occur in the casino nor typically the jurisdiction where the 
casino is located. As a result, the integrity of the sporting event is largely 
outside the control of the state regulators. Therefore, state governments 
must accept the risk that those who place sports wagers with the sportsbook 
could be the victim of fraud by competition manipulation. 
•  Limited Fan Engagement. State-ringed sports wagering will likely 
produce smaller, disaggregated wagering pools. This will affect traditional 
types of wagers, such as single-game wagering, because it limits the 
number of wagering opportunities, creates greater odds fluctuations, and 
limits liquidity. However, the bigger impact will be on new products 
designed to increase fan engagement. As online poker experienced, state-
based ring fencing produced smaller betting pools and poker game options 
that were not attractive. A similar result may occur with sports wagering 
where more immersive game products may only have viability with high 
liquidity. 
B. State Model #2: State Regulation with Open Markets 
Under this model, the regulation of sports betting would be the 
responsibility of the respective states. Unlike State Model #1, however, any 
operator who submitted to the licensing authority of a state could offer sports 
wagering in the state. In other words, the operator would not be required to 
have a physical presence in the state. This approach would resemble that used 
in the daily fantasy sports industry.40 In the United States, a firm can offer 
fantasy sports in multiple states, thus creating the liquidity necessary to operate 
a viable business. However, the company must comply with licensing and other 
standards imposed by the individual states. About a dozen states allow daily 
fantasy sports companies to offer their national contests within their state 
provided they comply with state laws for licensing, operational requirements, 
and consumer protections.41 
                                                          
40 Approval for licensure in DFS varies by state. In Tennessee, approval is from the 
Secretary of State’s office. See Fantasy Sports, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
https://sos.tn.gov/fantasysports (last visited Mar. 10, 2018). The Indiana Gaming 
Commission grants licenses in Indiana. See Scott L. Miley, Fantasy Sports 
Operators Get First State Licenses, GREENSBURGDAILYNEWS.COM (June 29, 
2017), http://www.greensburgdailynews.com/news/fantasy-sports-operators-get-
first-state-licenses/article_24557c23-4372-5688-b9ef-2f490519514d.html. 
Regulation of DFS in Maryland is overseen by the Comptroller of the state. See 
Dustin Gouker, Maryland Comptroller Officially Implements Fantasy Sports 
Regulations, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Jan. 3, 2017, 1:04 PM), https:// 
www.legalsportsreport.com/12544/maryland-comptroller-dfs-reguation/. 
41 Ryan Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State Tracker, ESPN (July 26, 
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Benefits of such an approach would include: 
•  Barriers to Entry. Barriers to entry would be reduced compared to the 
first state model because operators can determine which states they want to 
operate in based on factors like regulatory burden, costs, and business 
potential. Non-traditional gaming companies would have the opportunity to 
develop innovative forms of sports wagering in states they choose to 
operate in. Because companies would be subject to licensing and 
regulations in each state where they do business, however, the model does 
not guarantee uniformity. This will raise costs and potentially result in new 
products being either slow to market or only being offered in certain states. 
•  Increased Liquidity. While sports wagering is not as dependent on 
liquidity as daily fantasy sports, a non-national approach makes it difficult 
for small states to offer competitive pricing and hurts the ability of 
innovators to offer new products that have the prospect for higher fan 
engagement. This model reduces but does not eliminate the problems 
created by ring-fencing states and permitting intrastate wagering only. 
•  Speed to Market. States can determine how quickly to license and 
permit operators to access their markets. A new company may choose 
states with the fastest and least expensive regulatory path to licensing and 
operations and then expand to other states as it has resources to do so. 
•  Fan Engagement. Unlike model one that ring-fences activity into a 
particular state, this model allows companies to increase liquidity by 
leveraging multiple markets. This may promote innovative products that 
work better with higher liquidity or a more diverse fan base. 
•  Effectiveness of Ensuring Wagering Integrity. Like State Model #1, 
this model relies on states to ensure wagering integrity. As most states 
already have some form of gaming regulation, this model should be 
efficient and effective to ensure wagering integrity. 
Drawbacks might include: 
•  Barriers to Entry. Like State Model #1, entities wanting to offer sports 
betting in multiple states will have to obtain licenses in each of them. 
Therefore, licensing becomes expensive. Likewise, varying audit, 
accounting, operational and technical rules in states are burdensome and 
deter all but the most heavily capitalized companies from entering state 
markets. 
•  Ineffectiveness of Ensuring Sports Integrity. This model does not alter 
the concerns raised for State Model #1 regarding ensuring sports integrity. 
•  Political Viability. This model is based on an open market. Companies 
without ties to a particular state, such as owning or operating a racetrack or 
casino, would have access to the sports wagering market. Casinos, tribes, 
                                                          
2017), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799449/daily-fantasy-dfs-legal-
your-state-state-state-look. Nevada is the only exception that requires ring-fencing 
— which effectively eliminates any prospect for a viable industry. 
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and racetracks with powerful lobbies, or states with an influential state 
lottery, are likely to fight this approach. 
C. State Model #3: State Regulation with Reciprocity 
This model subjects operators to the regulatory authority only in the states 
in which they conduct operations and maintain servers, but allows them to 
accept wagers from bettors in any state that has authorized sports wagering. 
This is similar to how the Interstate Horseracing Act works in practice.42 
According to the popular interpretation of that law, a company wishing to 
engage in account-based wagering on horse races must obtain a license from a 
state that regulates that form of race wagering. The company has the choice of 
about twenty states that license race book operators.43 After obtaining this 
license, the race book can accept wagers from any state where betting on pari-
mutuel horseracing is legal, which includes about thirty-six states. 
Benefits of such an approach would include: 
•  Lower Barriers to Entry. The lowered regulatory burden of having to 
obtain a single license and comply only with the laws and regulations 
where a company is licensed would make it easier for operators to get to 
market. 
•  Liquidity and Revenue Potential. This state model provides the greatest 
liquidity because an operator can decide which jurisdiction to obtain a 
license and, after obtaining a license and all other necessary approvals, 
have access to the liquidity in all other states that permit sports wagering. 
•  Speed to Market. This state model provides the quickest speed to 
market because an operator can decide which jurisdictions to obtain a 
license. After obtaining a license and all other necessary approval the 
operator would have access to all other markets. This would stoke 
competition between states to create regulatory systems that can issue 
licenses expeditiously and provide for the least costly regulatory burdens. 
•  Fan Engagement. Like State Model #2, this model allows companies 
to increase liquidity by offering wagering in multiple markets. This 
liquidity will contribute to new products that may increase fan engagement. 
                                                          
42 Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-07 (2012). The Interstate 
Horseracing Act (IHA) was passed to “regulate interstate commerce with respect to 
wagering on horseracing, in order to further the horseracing and legal off-track 
betting industries in the United States.” There is a general prohibition on “interstate 
off-track wager[ing],” but there are exceptions for simulcast wagering with consent 
from the local jurisdiction. 
43 These states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Off Track Betting 
Locations, OTB.US, http://www.otb.us/off-track-betting-locations.html (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2018). 
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Drawbacks might include: 
•  Political Viability. States might be wary of permitting wagering in 
other jurisdictions where sports integrity and patron protection provisions 
are inadequate. 
•  Lack of Uniformity. Conflicts between state laws would complicate 
operations and revenue sharing between states. 
•  Ineffectiveness of Ensuring Wagering Integrity. Operators would 
migrate to states with the lowest taxes, least comprehensive licensing 
standards, and fewest regulatory hurdles.44 These varied licensing 
standards can produce a “race to the bottom” among states.45 That is, to 
attract gambling companies, states may relax licensing standards so that 
they are more attractive than competing states. This is not a phenomenon 
limited to the gaming world.46 States often vie to attract or retain 
businesses by offering weakened environmental rules, property tax 
abatements, and lowered wage scales for workers.47 Although business 
competition is a hallmark of a capitalistic system,48 the success of regulated 
gambling depends upon integrity and public perceptions of integrity. 
Overly aggressive competition among states may undermine these critical 
objectives. 
•  Ineffectiveness of Ensuring Sports Integrity. Effective standards of 
sports integrity would be challenging to implement. 
D. State Model #4: Liquidity Created by Interstate Agreements 
This approach would share most of the characteristics of State Model #3, 
but it would be based on a compact model. That is, operators could accept 
wagers from patrons in states that had entered an agreement with other states. 
Benefits of such an approach would include: 
•  Liquidity. Because it is based on the model used for internet poker and 
certain lottery products (like Powerball), there is some familiarity with how 
it would operate. Even though the four states that have legalized poker 
have reached an agreement to share liquidity, this has not made the activity 
especially lucrative. Greater liquidity, where states with a significant 
                                                          
44 See discussion of State Model #2, supra Part III-B. 
45 Race to the Bottom, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
us/dictionary/english/race-to-the-bottom (last visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
46 For an example of a race to bottom in the cruise ship industry, see Elizabeth 
Becker, Destination Nowhere: The Dark Side of the Cruise Industry, THE SATURDAY 
EVENING POST (Nov. / Dec. 2013), http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2014/04/ 
17/health-and-family/travel/the-dark-side-of-the-cruise-ship-industry.html. 
47 See Natalie Wong, Amazon’s HQ2 Deadline: Now the Real Competition Begins, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-10-19/amazon-s-hq2-deadline-now-the-real-competition-begins. 
48 NICOLAS MEISEL, GOVERNANCE CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: A DIFFERENT 
PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 41 (2004) (ebook). 
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combined population participate in the compact process, is likely 
necessary. As more states decide to legalize poker, this liquidity may 
develop. However, the slow rollout prevented poker sites from offering the 
products that the public wanted. National efforts to engage fans of poker 
through television and other media were not attached with opportunities to 
play and increase skill. 
•  Effectiveness of Wagering Integrity. States would have primary 
responsibility for regulating the operators in their state. The individual 
states would also have the power to enter or not enter compacts with other 
states. States would have the discretion not to allow operators from a state 
where regulatory oversight is lacking. This prevents race-to-the-bottom 
concerns where operators would otherwise be attracted to the states with 
the lowest taxes and least regulation. Moreover, compacts could be worked 
out between states according to the specific values and interests of the 
state. 
•  Barriers to Entry. Because an operator would not have to obtain a 
license in every state, barriers to entry would be lower than State Model #1 
that only permits intrastate wagering. 
Drawbacks might include (in addition to those noted in State Model #3): 
•  Speed to Market and Political Viability. Compacts would need to 
reconcile difficult issues of regulation, taxation, licensing, and revenue 
sharing. These differences may prevent or delay the implementation of a 
multistate system. As an example, though Nevada authorized internet 
poker in 2013, and New Jersey authorized internet poker in 2010, the states 
did not agree to a compact until 2017. Moreover, some larger states, like 
California, which has significant liquidity on an intrastate basis, may be 
hesitant to open its market to operators from smaller states. 
IV.    THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. The Federal Model – Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction 
One plausible model of regulation would have the federal government as 
the regulator of sports wagering. A federal law would set out the terms of 
licensing and regulation, and direct a federal agency or entity to administer the 
law, promulgate and enforce regulations, and coordinate regulation with states. 
Under this approach, states would choose to opt in, or not. That is, no state 
would be required to offer sports betting.49 A state choosing to participate, 
                                                          
49 States that do not permit commercial or tribal gambling are: Arkansas, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Kentucky, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
and Virginia. 2016 State of the States, AM. GAMING ASS’N, https://www.american 
gaming.org/sites/default/files/2016%20State%20of%20the%20States_FINAL.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2018); Gambling has always been the purview of the states as 
PASPA is “the only federal law in history” regulating states’ regulation of 
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however, would be subject to the federal statutory regime. 
Some benefits of this approach include: 
•  Lower Barriers to Entry. Compliance costs for companies would likely 
be lower compared to a non-uniform system. For example, licensing of 
companies and principals would be a one-time experience (at least 
initially), rather than the serial approach that most state-based models 
would produce. Similarly, the burdensomeness of varying state audit 
requirements would be eliminated. A single template for audit and 
accounting would streamline the process and reduce costs,50 and business 
planning would be enhanced by a uniform and straightforward federal 
taxing structure. A system could be created for sharing tax revenues with 
states. Reduced entry barriers would allow for companies to get to market 
quickly. Also, having to satisfy only one set of regulatory requirements 
would promote the emergence of non-traditional gambling companies; this 
would spur competition and innovation. 
•  Increased Liquidity. Having a unified network of the opting-in states 
would promote liquidity. Companies would have a single market in which 
all gaming proceeds would be pooled. 
•  Fan Engagement. A national liquid market with fan diversity and low 
barriers to entry is the best incubator for innovative products that are likely 
to produce the highest degree of fan engagement. 
•  Effectiveness of Ensuring Sports Integrity. The consistency of 
standards and enforcement from a federal system of regulation would 
implicate several aspects of a sports betting structure and help to serve 
important public policy objectives. Increasingly, the integrity of contests 
held in the U.S. is not just a matter of regulating bettors in the U.S. Illegal 
sports gambling markets in Asia have a connection to contest 
manipulation, and though their influence may not have affected U.S. 
betting markets, that could change.51 International cooperation is essential 
to address match fixing of contests held inside and outside the U.S. A 
federal system that would facilitate the collection of data so that threats to 
game integrity could be quickly identified and acted upon by federal law 
enforcement offers efficiencies that state regulation could not achieve. This 
may be among the reasons the major sports leagues in the U.S. seem to 
                                                          
gambling. See I. Nelson Rose, Betting on Sports Betting, 18 GAMING L. REV. AND 
ECON. 956 (2014). 
50 A patchwork of regulations and taxes greatly complicate business for companies 
as evidenced by the current experience of daily fantasy sports companies. See 
Dustin Gouker, Fantasy Sports Industry ‘Deeply Concerned’ With $50K Fee in 
Virginia Law, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Mar. 8, 2016, 8:04AM) https://www.legal 
sportsreport.com/8915/fsta-pushes-back-on-dfs-fees/. 
51 Declan Hill et al., The Status of Sports Wagering, 18 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 
8, 14 (2014). 
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favor a centralized system of regulation.52 
 Likewise, states are at a disadvantage in developing laws and 
regulations that would curb insiders from acting on information not 
available to the betting public. While states could share information on 
suspected betting irregularities by insiders, a centralized regulatory system 
would likely be more effective in detecting such activity. This has been one 
of the strengths of the manner in which securities are regulated at the 
federal level.53 
 The Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was created by the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “to restore investor confidence in our 
capital markets by providing investors and the markets with more reliable 
information and clear rules of honest dealing.”54 Prior to the establishment 
of the SEC, regulating the honesty of the securities markets was left to the 
state governments through the creation of state regulatory schemes known 
as “Blue Sky” laws. These proved ineffective as stock promoters complied 
only with the laws of the states with the least regulation or the most 
corruption and used that as a basis for offering the stocks on a national 
basis.55 
 Securities regulation and sports wagering have striking similarities. 
Both concern the regulation of exchanges involving contracts where the 
purchaser/bettor is attempting to earn profits based on a future contingent 
event. In both markets, the government is interceding into the markets to 
                                                          
52 Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-
legalize-sports-betting.html (“Congress should adopt a federal framework that 
allows states to authorize betting on professional sports, subject to strict regulatory 
requirements and technological safeguards. . . Without a comprehensive federal 
solution, state measures such as New Jersey’s recent initiative will be both 
unlawful and bad public policy.”). 
53 The United States Government regulates securities primarily through the 
Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012). The Securities Act has two 
basic objectives: (1) “[R]equire that investors receive financial and other significant 
information concerning securities being offered for public sale;” and (2) “[P]rohibit 
deceit misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.” See What We 
Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwe 
do.html#laws (last visited Mar. 12, 2018); States also have authority to regulate 
securities within their state. These laws, known as “Blue Sky Laws,” are often 
modeled on their federal analog. Because of the overlapping and duplicative nature 
of many of these state laws, some have called for an entire, or field preemption, of 
state regulation of securities. See Rutherford Campbell Jr., The Case for Federal 
Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/report/the-case-federal-pre-emption-
state-blue-sky-laws. 
54 15 U.S.C. § 78a; What We Do, supra note 53. 
55 See Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to State Securities (Blue Sky) Laws, 
SECLAW.COM, http://www.seclaw.com/introduction-to-state-securities-laws/ (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
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protect the honesty of those contracts. Because the security markets, like 
the sports markets, exist on a national (and international) level, state 
regulation alone is inadequate. 
 States were unwilling to concede power to regulate the securities 
markets until after the stock market crash of 1929. While the SEC has 
faced criticism for both overregulation and under regulation, no serious 
discussion exists that it is not a better system than what previously existed 
under state control or that it should be dissolved. Ultimately, a centralized 
system has significant advantages. 
The federal/national approach would also have potential shortcomings: 
•  Effectiveness of Ensuring Wagering Integrity. While there is a 
prominent federal role in areas such as securities regulation and civilian 
aviation, Congress has no real expertise in establishing gaming regulatory 
regimes. The most recent effort to address sports betting — the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”) — is a deeply 
flawed law.56 
 No likely or appropriate federal entity exists where the regulatory 
locus would reside. A lack of experience and expertise for establishing a 
regulatory regime could impair achievement of the positives listed above. 
The “learning curve” for the new regulatory entity could lead to slow 
implementation which would frustrate potential market entrants. 
 However, some federal agencies can serve as models. Agencies such 
as the SEC and Federal Aviation Adminsitration discharge traditional 
administrative regulatory functions like licensing, enforcement, testing, and 
audits. As discussed above, the SEC may be the closest parallel both in 
mission and history. 
 Finally, especially with the creation of a new regulatory body, there is 
a tendency to over-regulate. That is, the new entity might fulfill the 
standard view of the federal government as a bloated bureaucracy which 
stifles innovation and competition by imposing burdensome regulations. 
•  Speed to Market. Nothing about a model of federal regulation supports 
an idea that market entry could be handled more expeditiously than with a 
state system. 
•  Political Viability. The current dysfunction of Congress inspires little 
confidence that it can establish a workable system, especially since 
                                                          
56 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2012) (prohibiting gambling businesses from 
knowingly accepting payments “in connection with the participation of another 
person” in “a bet or wager . . . which involves the use . . . of the Internet . . . [and 
that] is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law”). The criticism of 
UIEGA has been deep and wide: See I. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537, 
538 (2006); I. Nelson Rose, Congress Makes Sausages, 11 GAMING L. REV. 1, 1 
(2007). 
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decentralization of government functions is accelerating.57 Moreover, 
states will strongly object to being taken out of the regulation of sports 
betting and emphasize that regulation of gambling is typically left to the 
states. The state of Nevada, with its mature sports betting market, would 
not quietly accept being displaced by a federal system of regulation. 
B. Mixed Federal and State Authority Model 
1. Assigning Responsibilities for Sports Integrity to the Federal 
Government and Wagering Integrity to the State Government 
A variation on the first model would still require federal legislation. States 
opting in would be required to demonstrate compliance with a template of 
regulation established by federal law. States would be in charge of wagering 
integrity through regulation in their state and would be empowered to tailor that 
regulation in ways provided for in the legislation. 
Advantages of this approach would be: 
•  Effectiveness of Ensuring Wagering Integrity. States would retain their 
traditional authority of regulation of gaming, but within a framework that 
would still feature uniformity on matters such as licensing, and audit and 
accounting rules. Moreover, the ability of a state to tailor its gambling laws 
respects the different values states attach to gambling and eschews a “one 
size fits all” approach. 
•  Effectiveness of Ensuring Sports Integrity. The threats to sports 
integrity have a genesis in international commerce and need to be 
                                                          
57 A common way that the federal government has decentralized government 
functions is in the form of block grants. Block grants are when the federal 
government provides a state with a sum of money with only general guidance on 
how the grant is to be administered. States are then free to fill in the gaps in 
regulation as they see fit, so long as they do not run afoul of the general directions 
provided by the federal government. Proponents of block grants claim that they 
allow states to tailor the regulation and provisioning of government funds based on 
local conditions and needs, whereas critics of block grants contend that unspecific 
direction from the federal government allows states to sabotage programs that 
officials in the state may oppose for political reasons. See Shefali Luthra, 
Everything You Need to Know About Block Grants — The Heart of GOP’s 
Medicaid Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://khn.org/news/ 
block-grants-medicaid-faq/. The biggest block grant that states receive from the 
federal government is Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). In 2015, 
the federal government spent $16.5 billion in TANF block grants. Office of Family 
Assistance, State TANF Spending in FY 2015, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/ state-tanf-
spending-2015-factsheet. True to the concerns of some critics of block grants, the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that states spend only half of their 
TANF money on “core welfare reform areas.” Liz Schott & Ife Floyd, How States 
Use Funds Under the TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/how-states-
use-funds-under-the-tanf-block-grant. 
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addressed through both national and international efforts. 
 Having a central agency as the point of contact for intelligence is 
important and will facilitate creating the national and global expertise 
necessary to investigate and prosecute threats to sports integrity. A small 
state regulatory agency would not have the experience, knowledge base, 
information, or jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute international sports 
corruption. For example, it would have been difficult or impossible for 
state agencies to develop the case involving the FIFA bribery charges. It 
took the resources and expertise of the FBI and federal prosecutors to 
handle this. 
 Uniform standards defining permissible conduct, such as insider 
trading rules, are important to sports integrity. If states have different rules 
regarding what is permissible, persons wanting to skirt more restrictive 
regulations need only find the state with the lowest standards. This will 
frustrate national efforts to police sports integrity. 
•  Speed to Market. No significant federal bureaucracy would need to be 
created. The entity to which states would certify compliance could have a 
smaller footprint within an existing federal agency. 
Drawbacks to this modified approach might include: 
•  Effectiveness of Ensuring Wagering Integrity. The federal body with 
responsibility for ensuring state compliance would have to develop 
expertise on how different states wanted to adjust gambling laws in their 
states according to local preference. This would create a federal 
bureaucracy without the benefits of uniformity on matters such as 
permitted bet types. 
•  Barriers to Entry. The economies achieved by a national uniform 
system of licensing and regulation would be lost, thus increasing costs to 
operating companies. 
•  Political Viability. This approach would certainly be more acceptable 
to states than a system that displaces their regulation with a federal system. 
But a model like this still requires federal legislation, a daunting prospect 
given the current political climate. 
V.    ISSUES THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN ANY MODEL OF 
REGULATION 
Some issues would in varying degrees require the attention of 
policymakers regardless of the model that is implemented. A few of these 
issues are noted. 
A. Would the Consent of the Leagues Need to be Obtained for Their Games to 
be Offered for Wagering? 
One of the biggest stumbling blocks to the expansion of sports betting 
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beyond Nevada has been the opposition of the major sports leagues.58 The 
opposition has persisted even as the major sports leagues have given support to, 
and have had relationships with, fantasy sports operators whose daily games 
have some of the characteristics of sports betting.59 
The hostility toward sports betting appeared to weaken in 2014 when NBA 
Commissioner Adam Silver wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times 
suggesting that sports betting needed to “be brought out of the underground and 
into the sunlight where it can be appropriately monitored and regulated.”60 
Despite this sentiment, the NBA continued to challenge New Jersey’s plan to 
offer regulated sports betting and did not offer a proposal to change PASPA. 
More recently, Silver said he thought the laws on sports betting would be 
changing “in the next few years in the United States.”61 
After the Supreme Court accepted review of the New Jersey case in June of 
2017, Major League Baseball Commissioner Rob Manfred seemed to 
acknowledge the coming of sports betting. He told the Baseball Writers’ 
Association of America, that, “[i]f there’s going to be a change in the 
regulatory structure . . . we needed to be in a position to meaningfully engage 
and shape, try to shape what the new regulatory scheme looks like.”62 This 
comment came after Manfred had earlier commented that baseball was 
“reexamining [its] stance on gambling.”63 
Although NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman curiously asserted that the 
                                                          
58 See Mike Wilkening, Goodell: NFL’s Opposition to Legalized Sports Gambling 
Isn’t Changing, NBC SPORTS (Jan. 31, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://profootball 
talk.nbcsports.com/2014/01/31/goodell-nfls-opposition-to-legalized-sports-
gambling-isnt-changing/; Brent Schrotenboer, NFL’s Gambling Policy Appears 
Consistently Inconsistent, USA TODAY (June 12, 2017, 8:55 PM), https://www.usa 
today.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/06/11/gambling-las-vegas-casino-naming-rights-
advertising/102634272/; Ryan Lovelace, Chris Christie Blasts NFL Over Sports 
Gambling: ‘The Hypocrisy is Just So Overwhelming’, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 25, 
2017, 12:52 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/chris-christie-blasts-nfl-
over-sports-gambling-the-hypocrisy-is-just-so-overwhelming/article/2638588. 
59 Numerous teams in the major sports in the U.S. have partnership and 
sponsorship agreements with the daily fantasy sports companies DraftKings and 
FanDuel. See Gouker, supra note 27 (providing a complete list of such 
arrangements). 
60 Silver, supra note 52. 
61 Kyle Boone, NBA Commissioner Optimistic Sports Betting Will Be Legalized ‘In 
the Next Few Years’, CBS SPORTS.COM (July 19, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com 
/nba/news/nba-commissioner-optimistic-sports-betting-will-be-legalized-in-the-
next-few-years/. 
62 The Canadian Press, Manfred: MLB Open to More Aggressively Managing 
Change, TSN (July 11, 2017), http://www.tsn.ca/manfred-mlb-open-to-more-
aggressively-managing-change-1.802126. 
63 Daniel Roberts, MLB Commissioner: ‘We are Re-examining Our Stance on 
Gambling’, YAHOO FIN. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/baseball-
commissioner-we-are-reexamining-our-stance-on-gambling-170536801.html. 
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“game doesn’t lend itself to gambling in the way football and basketball do,”64 
the presence of a new NHL franchise in Las Vegas would likely dilute 
whatever opposition that league has.65 
It has been the intransigence of the NFL that has seemed to be the biggest 
obstacle to sports betting. Commissioner Goodell has been steadfast in 
expressing opposition to expanded sports betting. This is usually couched in 
terms of concerns regarding game integrity. Even Goodell, however, has 
acknowledged the moving of the Oakland Raiders to Las Vegas raises issues 
about continued opposition to sports betting.66 
A theme expressed by both Commissioners Silver and Manfred is that 
sports betting increased fan engagement with the sport. This is no doubt the 
case with the NFL (and NHL) as well. The term “fan engagement” is a 
euphemism for increased revenue for the leagues. 
Ultimately, if a federal system of sports betting were established, the 
legislation would likely not allow the leagues to withhold consent for their 
games to be the object of wagers. On the other hand, if the system of sports 
betting is state-based, this option would seem to be available. However, this 
presents a problem. 
One of the criticisms of the manner in which the leagues have opposed 
sports betting while supporting daily fantasy sports is that the leagues are 
picking the forms of sports betting that they gain from financially while 
opposing those they do not.67 Leagues would be vulnerable to the same 
criticism if they could selectively withhold consent for sportsbooks to offer 
their games to the public. Ultimately, the legislation establishing a sports 
betting regulatory regime would need to spell this out explicitly. 
                                                          
64 Greg Wyshynski, Gary Bettman’s Sports Gambling Flip-Flop?, YAHOO SPORTS 
(Sept. 9, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/gary-bettmans-sports-
gambling-flip-flop-162345685.html. 
65 Despite claims by Las Vegas Golden Knights owner that betting on the team 
would have limited availability at Las Vegas sportsbooks, wagering on the team is 
available at every sportsbook. See Dustin Gouker, Las Vegas NHL Owner: ‘You 
Won’t Be Able to Bet On The Golden Knights’ At Some Casinos, LEGAL SPORTS 
REPORT (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:52 PM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/15110/ 
betting-on-las-vegas-golden-knights/; see David Purdum, Betting on Golden 
Knights Available at Every Sportsbook in Las Vegas, ESPN (Oct. 10, 2017), 
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/20977517/betting-vegas-golden-knights-
available-every-sportsbook-las-vegas. 
66 See Mike Florio, How Can NFL Reconcile Loving Las Vegas and Loathing 
Betting Lines?, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 25, 2017, 3:01 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbc 
sports.com/2017/03/25/how-can-nfl-reconcile-loving-las-vegas-and-loathing-
betting-lines/. 
67 See Ken Belson, As It Embraces Las Vegas, N.F.L. Is Awash in Gambling 
Contradictions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04 
/18/sports/football/as-it-embraces-las-vegas-nfl-is-awash-in-gambling-
contradictions.html. 
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B. Would Sports Betting be “Monetized” for the Leagues? 
From the perspective of the major sports leagues in the U.S., the opposition 
to expand regulated gambling may relate to one fundamental question: What is 
in it for us? The path forward for legalized sports betting in some respects 
depends upon the support or at least acquiescence of the leagues. For this 
support to be gained, a means of compensating the leagues for the use of their 
games as the source of betting may need to be established.68 Nevertheless, 
proposals requiring sportsbooks to share revenue with the sports leagues have 
been very controversial. 
Three reasons support compensating the leagues. First, the teams and 
contestants have rights in their names and performance, and the sports betting 
operations are using this information for commercial advantage. Under existing 
law, the sports betting operations do not have to pay to use the names or 
performance data because the First Amendment preempts these rights and other 
intellectual property protections do not attach to the information.69 Despite not 
having a legal right to compensation, public policies underlying the right of 
publicity suggest that compensation to the teams and players that create the 
opportunity for commercial exploitation of the games for wagering may be 
worthy of consideration. As some commentators have noted, “Without these 
events, betting providers would not be able to sell a marketable product. 
Betting providers share this dependence on the platform sport with other 
stakeholders of football institutions.”70 
                                                          
68 See Andrew Brandt, The NFL Has a Gambling Problem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.si.com/mmqb/2015/11/05/nfl-gambling-daily-fantasy-
dfs-draftkings-fanduel-goodell. 
69 In National Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. 
Del. 1977), the court found that once the NFL disseminates schedules and scores, it 
no longer expects generating revenue. The value of a sporting event is based on the 
uncertainty of the outcome. Walter Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional 
Sport, 78 Q.J. OF ECON., 1–14 (1964). So, once the event has occurred, the value of 
the recording of that event drops to virtually nothing. Stefan Szymanski, The 
Assessment: The Economics of Sport, 19 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 467-77 
(2003). The same is true of sports wagers where the principal concerns of the 
player are that the games are honest (not fixed), fair (that they are played according 
to transparent and evenly informed rules) and they will get paid if they win. In 
National Basketball Association v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) the 
Second Circuit found that basketball games are not subject to copyright protection 
because they are not original works of authorship. See Anastasios Kaburakis, Ryan 
M. Rodenberg, & John T. Holden, Inevitable: Sports Gambling, State Regulation, 
and the Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARVARD BUS. L. REV. 27 (2015), 
http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Kaburakis-Rodenberg-Holden-
Inevitable.pdf; see also C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) 
70 Helmut Dietl & Christian Weingärtner, Betting Scandals and Attenuated 
Property Rights – How Betting Related Match Fixing Can Be Prevented in Future 
(Univ. of Zurich Inst. of Strategy and Bus. Econ, Working Paper No. 154, 2012); 
Kaburakis, Inevitable, supra note 69. 
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Second, the sportsbooks need the efforts and cooperation of the sports 
governing bodies and the athletes to assure that the wagering propositions they 
offer are resolved based on honest competition. Giving the governing bodies a 
financial stake in the revenues from wagering on their sports can only enhance 
this cooperation. 
Finally, any failures of the wagering and sports industries to assure the 
integrity of the game has negative economic consequences to society. 
Compensating the sports governing bodies to put into place additional 
structures and procedures can help to reduce the likelihood of these failures. 
In 2018, Indiana considered a proposal for sports betting that included a 
one percent “integrity tax” being imposed on the handle that would go to the 
leagues. Some estimates are that leagues could gain as much as $2 billion/year 
if such a tax were imposed on a national basis.71 Criticisms of an “integrity tax” 
emphasize that a tax on handle cuts already thin margins for regulated 
sportsbooks by approximately twenty percent and that it is uncertain why 
leagues would have such high costs for monitoring integrity in a regulated 
market.72 
Another model for revenue sharing would be to impose a one percent tax 
on handle, with half being distributed to the leagues and players’ associations, 
and half to a federally administered fund that would compensate amateur and 
professional athletes for catastrophic injury.73 This type of approach would 
serve two functions: first, it would likely provide the leagues considerable fresh 
revenue. Most of the betting is currently occurring illegally with the leagues 
gaining nothing. The betting tax revenues come at the expense of no other 
lawful activity. The other benefit to this approach is that it would allow the 
leagues to present themselves as advancing a good cause. For example, it 
would offer the NFL the opportunity to support sports betting as a way of 
advancing societal interests and holding itself out as a good public citizen. 
Providing compensation to injured athletes might help assuage concerns about 
the safety of contact sports like football.74 
Without question, the formula for establishing such a system would be 
problematic and likely contentious. Administrative costs relating to collecting 
the tax and distributing the proceeds might be significant. Nevertheless, if 
                                                          
71 Dustin Gouker, New Version of Indiana Sports Betting Bill Includes Hefty 
‘Integrity Fee’ Paid to Sports Leagues, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/17400/indiana-sports-betting-integrity-fee/. 
72 Id. 
73 See Anthony Cabot, The Absence of a Comprehensive Federal Policy Toward 
Internet and Sports Wagering and a Proposal for Change, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L. J. 271, 306 (2010). 
74 See Shannon Ho, ‘Bad for Your Brain’: CTE Reports, Concussions Deter 
Parents from Youth Football, NBC CHI. (July 31, 2017, 7:24 AM), 
https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/health/CTE-Reports-Impact-Future-of-Youth-
Football-436639243.html. 
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leagues were ready to put their weight behind broadly legal sports betting 
contingent on this being worked out, there would be incentives for all interested 
parties to reach an agreement.75 
On the other hand, sportsbooks have a compelling argument that the 
margins on sports wagers are so small that any revenue sharing would raise 
prices and drive consumers to illegal markets where they can get better odds. 
Moreover, the concept of revenue sharing is contrary to existing law in the 
United States where the sportsbooks only need the results of the contest or 
events within the game (i.e., names, statistics, scores, real-time data) and 
anyone can use them for free once made public.76 Therefore, the government 
should not create rights not recognized by law to benefit an industry. 
A potential solution that would direct revenue to the leagues while not 
imposing new taxes on sportsbooks involves the existing federal excise tax on 
sports wagers. This tax on sports wagers was first imposed in 1951 at a rate of 
ten percent on the gross handle.77 The legislative history of the law creating the 
tax was to “facilitate the enforcement of state criminal laws against 
gambling.”78 If the purpose of the tax was to prevent legitimate, licensed 
sportsbook operations from operating, it succeeded, as no sportsbook could 
operate profitably with that tax load. 
In 1974, the tax rate was reduced to a more manageable two percent with 
the result being that the first casino based sportsbooks sprang up in Las Vegas. 
And in 1983, the tax was reduced to its present rate of 0.25%.79 
Based on figures compiled by the Urban Institute & Brookings Institution 
Tax Policy Center, approximately $4.2 million in revenue was generated by the 
sports wagering excise tax in 2015, as compared to the $3.3 trillion of total tax 
revenue collected by the IRS.80 However, if sports betting were more widely 
available, the excise tax revenues could increase dramatically. A total handle of 
$100 billion in regulated US markets would produce $250 million in excise 
taxes. 
While the federal government might be unwilling to forego all that 
revenue, there is a federal interest in reducing corruption in sports wagering. 
                                                          
75 See David Lariviere, Legalization of Sports Betting Would Be Huge Revenue 
Producer for Leagues, Expert Says, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2014, 11:13 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidlariviere/2014/09/19/legalization-of-sports-
betting-would-be-huge-revenue-producer-for-leagues-expert-says/#551040b02d1c. 
76 Dietl, Betting Scandals, supra note 70. 
77 DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITION AND THE 
INTERNET 169 (2005). 
78 Note, The Federal Gambling Tax and the Constitution, 43 J. OF CRIM. L. AND 
CRIMINOLOGY 637, 637 (1953). 
79 Schwartz, supra note 77, at 169. 
80 URBAN INSTITUTE & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION TAX POLICY CENTER, FEDERAL 
EXCISE TAX REVENUE (2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/federal-
excise-tax-revenue. 
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Directing some of the excise tax revenue to the sports governing bodies can 
help to curb corruption while still allowing for sportsbooks to be profitable 
undertakings. This approach has the benefit of not imposing additional costs on 
sportsbooks which are already paying the excise tax. The excise tax on sports 
betting was created to discourage betting on sports, a sentiment that has 
changed considerably over the years. Ultimately, if a system of sports betting 
with integrity is to exist in the U.S., compromises from all parties, including the 
federal government, will be needed. 
As sports betting markets mature and introduce more betting products, 
opportunities for monetizing the betting activity to benefit the leagues will 
increase. For example, sports betting could include betting exchanges where 
bettors offer or take positions on sports events. This peer-to-peer model allows 
buyers and sellers to be matched up on opposite sides of betting propositions. 
The betting platform operates similar to a stock exchange, charging a 
commission fee on the transactions conducted. Exchange wagering platforms in 
the U.S. originated in horse racing, with New Jersey one of the first states to 
authorize such markets.81 
To a significant extent, the exchange wagering model of sports betting 
resembles traditional securities markets. The federal government predominantly 
regulates these financial markets.82 This may be a factor that would tilt the 
preferred regulatory model for sports betting exchanges toward a federal rather 
than state orientation. The diversity of betting offerings in exchange wagering 
may also be attractive to the sports leagues because the market offerings would 
not necessarily be tied to point spreads. However, the leagues could still profit 
from the betting exchanges through a surcharge on the transactions processed 
through the exchange. This is an approach used in other countries where sports 
                                                          
81 Pioneered by Paddy Power Betfair, and now the world’s largest publicly traded 
online gambling company, exchange wagering is a high-tech manner of gaming 
aimed at enticing younger gamblers into the market. The European company is 
hoping to use the internet to tap into the $3.5 billion wagered on horse racing 
online in 2015. See Joe Drape, High-Tech Wagering Sees Gateway Into America: 
The Horse Track, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
07/30/sports/horse-racing/betfair-exchange-wagering-gambling-horse-racing.html. 
82 Equities regulation falls within the purview of numerous organizations. Federal 
government regulation is undertaken by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Division of Trading and Markets. Among their responsibilities is to “regulate[] the 
major securities market participants, including broker-dealers, self-regulatory 
organizations. . .and transfer agents.” Trading and Markets, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page/tmsectionlanding (last modified 
Jan. 30, 2017). The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is a non-
profit organization authorized by the federal government to regulate equities 
markets. FINRA regulates the markets by writing and enforcing rules for brokers, 
examining firms for compliance with rules, and encouraging transparency. See 
About FINRA, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, https://www.finra.org/about (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2018). Other regulatory activities in the equities market are 
undertaken by the individual stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
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betting is widely permitted. 
CONCLUSION 
The court challenges to PASPA have been a compelling part of the story of 
the ascendance of sports wagering in the U.S. But as is often said, the devil is 
in the details. It would be unfortunate if the expansion of sports betting in the 
U.S. were threatened or stunted because of regulatory failings that undermined 
the integrity of the activity. Careful thought needs to be given to the many 
issues raised here, or the long legal battle to bring sports wagering out of the 
shadows and into the light of regulation might be in vain. 
 
